Physical Morality- a language problem.

I have a theory! No, really, I do.

I should add that my research is nowhere near good enough to be sure if it is actually new or previously expressed by someone else of whom I am unaware. And with that caveat I would like to spell it out here.

I think that humans, and possibly other social animals like dogs, place massive value on Intent when assessing how to respond to an action by a conspecific.

An act taken that has negative results, but was intended to be positive, will be most readily forgiven; an act that was taken without malice, but caused harm by accident, is also somewhat lightly forgiven, but an act that was taken with some degree of ill intent will be resented intensely, even if it comparatively trifling.

A friend of mine once hit me in the face so hard that it nearly broke my nose, but as we were just fooling about and he meant no harm, we were both laughing about it before I had stopped seeing stars.

On the other hand, and spite of trying to forget them, I continue to resent some unkind words that have been directed at me years ago, which objectively, hurt an order of magnitude less than my mate's epic backhand while we were playing some daft teenage game.

This makes sense for creatures that live in groups and rely on each other a lot, as you would not want to alienate an ally for hurting you accidentally, nor to tolerate abuse from a real enemy, however small the injury. Even if you could not retaliate at the time, tit for tat is a strategy that we use a lot, and remembering and keeping track of such slights is something that we are disturbingly good at, as we would be at avenging them too, if social strictures didn't keep our nano-vendettas under control for the most part.

This is all well and good when the issue at stake is social interactions between primates, but when, as has happened recently, we extend our notions of worth to other creatures and indeed to landforms and ecosystems, we are now trying to apply a very specific, primate-and-maybe-dog small group moral instinct to repositories of moral value which frankly don't give a toss about intent.

this can lead to some truly disturbing logic, in which all kinds of pointless acts are justified and even suggested: Its the principle of the thing, every bit counts, it sets a good example, etc etc, which in a more human context would amount to the social theatre of demonstrating good will; even if the results were inadequate, one could appease the wronged by demonstrating some effort in the right direction. The gods that we propriate seem to have a moral sense that is very remarkable in being so close to that of the higher primates; it matters to Him if you meant well/are sorry/do some nice things to compensate, or some pointless things to demonstrate loyalty.

But the physical world is neither a fellow ape, nor an Anthropomorphic God, to whom this kind of crap matters. The only language that an endangered species understands is undisturbed habitat. 

This leads us to the unexpected conclusion that the only kind of moral reasoning that can be justified in relation to environmental goals is consequentialist. What matters is the end result, and nothing else, if we are looking at environmental actions. 

I would welcome an argument on this point, should anyone wish to bring one. 

Regards, 

Brutus 

(a member of the same species, as the term is used by Lorenz, I feel happy to use it here too:)